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Book Review

Ikechi Mgbeoji, Collective Insecurity."The Liberian Crisis, Unilateralism,
& Global Order Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 2003.
200pp.
Recently, a democratically elected president issued an order requiring
another President, also in office with, as it were, a democratic mandate, to
vacate office. The latter complied and no dissenting voice was raised from
anywhere in the rest of the world. The one is George W. Bush of the United
States; the other is Charles Taylor of Liberia. This arrangement raises several questions: How is this state of affairs possible in 21st century Africa?
How is it that Charles Taylor. a power hungry and known felon, became an
elected president of Liberia in the first place, one that left in his trail a
crisis-infested country that constitutes a threat to West African regional
security? And finally, what manner of collective international outside intervention is appropriate to tackle the recurring fratricidal crisis in Africa?
Using the Liberian crisis as a case study, Dr. Ikechi Mgbeoji's book
Collective Insecurity provides historical and contemporary insights into
the many years of intractable political instability in Africa. The author
explores "the dubious character of African states and their intrinsic capacity for collapse and insecurity"' - hile he argues that "the corrosion of the
African psyche and mutilation of precolonial African political structures
laid the basis for the modem crisis afflicting the continent."2 After examining the complicity of the colonial establishment, modem African elites,
and contemporary international law, Mgbeoji calls for a rethinking of the
quick-fix Eurocentric political and economic prescriptions offered as
solutions to all manner of African crisis, including political instability. His
model of legitimacy is one rooted in precolonial African political structures, and historical and cultural reality. He argues that the colonial undermining of these features of African societies is the basis of the crisis of
legitimacy in Africa.
Liberia and its contemporary experiences handily buttress the author's
thesis. Founded by returning slaves from the United States, Liberia is
Africa's first republic. In his book, Mgbeoji describes the complex and
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subtle intrigue in the United States behind the founding of a colony for
liberated slaves, not the least of which was the xenophobia in American
society towards the large population of freed Africans.' Although they
constituted only five percent of the Liberian population, Americo-Liberians
(as they were called) took advantage of their relative economic influence,
seized political power, and virtually re-enacted their slavery experience to
the detriment of the local natives. Established on a "politics of Americanized elitism," 4' and modeled uncritically after the political system of the
United States, Liberia became "a colony and a material projection of a
distorted polity and bizarre sense of intraracial superiority.'" For more than
125 years, Americo-Liberians held the reins of power and lorded over the
indigenous peoples in their new settlement.
Ineffective attempts to integrate the natives into the Liberian polity in
the 1960s could not contain almost one half century of deep-seated
discontent. Liberia imploded in 1980 in a bloody coup d'6tat that saw the
ascension to power of half-literate indigenous soldiers led by Samuel Doe.
Doe's regime was characterized by an extreme form of vendetta that both
literally and figuratively decapitated the Americo-Liberian oligarchy. Doe's
one-decade rule of brutality highlighted the ethnic complexity and
difficulties of the Liberian state. Under him, ethnic loyalty and allegiance
became the only condition for political advantage. Doe survived the halfhearted isolation of his government by African states through the support
of the United States. Despite his despotic and brutal credentials, "Doe had
ample resources for his unprecedented repression of the Liberian people.""
He obtained over US$500 million in American aid and military wares
between 1980-1985, ostensibly to ward off the anti-Western forays of
Muammar Ghaddafi into the region. Mbgeoji laments, "a considerable
number of despotic governments in Africa have been sustained by external support anchored on the cynical self-interests of powerful states in
Europe and of the United States. Consequently, the normative significance
of external support for African governments should not be exaggerated.""
Mgbeoji argues that the regimes of "internal illegitimacy,.... external
indifference," and complicity that enabled dictators like Doe to dominate
the African political landscape could not last. The end of the Cold War left
the dictators orphaned. Because their geopolitical relevance was eliminated, governments "were confronted with the imperatives of legitimizing
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themselves [with external neo-liberal forces more than] with their people
and grappling vith the inconsistencies of the artificial state."' Caught in
the middle of this transition, Doe sought legitimacy for his corrupt and
inhuman regime by resorting to the quick-fix Western prescription of
appropriating the democratic process (elections) to transform his dictatorship into a democracy. Thus, Mgbeoji decries the dominant liberal/Western ideology of respect for human rights and neo-liberal prescriptions, such
as periodic elections and privatization of public utilities, as a collective
solution to political illegitimacy "'without a fundamental appraisal of the
African state as presently constituted and governed." ' He argues that a
genuine attempt to fix the cycle of state failure in Africa must insist on
addressing the historical inequities in the polity and economy and give
"proper regard to African \alue systems of social and economic justice
and dignity. minority rights, and self-determination of peoples."' " The
aftermath of Doe's so-called democratic election in 1986 set the stage for
the collapse of the Liberian state. Post-election protests transformed Liberia
into a confederation of rebels. Power-hungry and blood-thirsty rebels and
elites, including Charles Taylor and Yomi Johnson, plunged the whole of
West Africa, especially Liberia and Sierra Leone, into fratricidal bloodletting. The international community wvas reluctant to promptly intervene, an
attitude consistent with the manner in \\ hich African affairs are generally
handled in global politics. Finally, however, the crisis resulted in the intervention of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
In an effort to determine the legality of the intervention, Mgbeoji
explores different schools of thought from international law regarding
collective security. Mgbeoji underlines the emerging consensus that the
instinct for collective security is not limited to var situations alone. Rather,
security encompasses concerns about democracy, legitimacy at even
municipal levels of governance, the environment, population control, refugee crisis and terrorism." He observes that a Western inspired approach to
collective security in which the doctrine of state sovereignty may be
compromised is critical for Africa. Ironically, African political elites cling
to near-absolute principles of state sovereignty, allowing no self-determination for African nationalities dispersed across the states arbitrarily
contrived by the Berlin Conference. For instance, the nine indigenous
Liberian nationalities traverse four other West African countries, namely
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Mali, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and C6te d'lvoire. While blocking the
self-determination of peoples through the principle of state sovereignty,
African political elites "[feel] better condemning oppression and denial of
the right of self-determination if perpetrated by an external, European or
Western power."' 2 Consequently, collective security in the African context
is yet to fully embrace the contemporary progressive approach to that
concept.
Nonetheless, Mgbeoji finds that ECOWAS intervention fulfils all the
conditions for the employment of collective security both under customary international law and ECOWAS treaty framework. It is interesting that
Mgboeji finds intervention to be well founded under the UN Charter
especially because of direct aggression by Burkina Faso. As that country
sent its military personnel to aid a faction of the rebels in Liberia, "[t]he
decision of the International Court of Justice in the NicaraguaCase leaves
little doubt that the Burkinabe government action took the matter out of
the rubric of indirect aggression to one of actual direct aggression constituting armed attack."' 3 This warrants the invocation of the right to collective security by West African nations. In Mgbeoji's opinion, a combination of other factors and circumstances also confer legitimacy on the
ECOWAS intervention. These include, but are not limited to the following:
the practice of states; the rebel forces' lack of status as belligerents under
international law; Doe's reduction to the status of a symbolic power holder,
being confined to the presidential mansion at the time of his invitation to
ECOWAS to intervene; the invitation itself; the instruments authorizing
ECOWAS action as a collective treaty regime for mutual self-defence
amongst ECOWAS members, especially the Protocol on Mutual Assistance
on Defence (PMD); the notion of a comprehensive self; 4 and the interwoven security interest among the West African states.
Indeed the Liberian crisis spilled over to Sierra Leone in the form of a
full-blown civil war, and generated a monumental refugee crisis in the rest
of the sub-region. Finally, pursuant to the procedural prescriptions of
Article 51 of the UN Charter, the West African nations promptly informed
the United Nations Security Council of the actions they had taken. 5
Supporting the pragmatic, as opposed to a doctrinaire approach to peacemaking, Mgbeoji argues that the consequential action of the ECOWAS
Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in organizing a hurried election
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in Liberia and bringing about a stabilized polity "was necessary, timely,
and proportionate to the threat of peace posed by the conflict."' 6
Even though Mgbeoji is unequivocal on the legality of ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, he opposes the proactive role of regional bodies such as
NATO, and in this case, ECOWAS, with regard to taking pre-emptive
measures or enforcement actions. Mgbeoji notes that before the present
era, ideological rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union
displaced a centralized approach to collective security and promoted the
option of empowerment of regional bodies. He observes that the United
Nations Security Council is the only body under the Charter responsible
for determining what constitutes a threat to global peace, and is therefore
the most appropriate body to engage in enforcement action. Arguing that
the Council should never abdicate its control of enforcement action, he
points out that should the Council ever be in a position of rivalry with, or
be in subordination to, regional alliances regarding the decision as to the
use of force under international law, such a state of affairs would not augur
well for global security in the 21st century. Enforcement action by a regional body, without the prior approval of the Council, would be a return
to unilateralism, especially if such action is taken by strong states who
exert or possess regional or global influence. Mgbeoji contends that the
emergence of"coalitions of the \\ illing" that are willing to undermine the
United Nations Security Council, is a challenge to global order. The increasing willingness of the Council to assume the role of a ratifier of enforcement actions and other legal duties belonging to it that have been
usurped by regional bodies such as ECOWAS or NATO sets a dangerous
precedent. This attitude of the Council may encourage powerful states to
"engage in illicit enforcement actions with the real or even vague hope
that the Council will [be coerced or blackmailed to] ratify such acts."'"
Although his fears about the potential usurpation of the Council's exclusive powers over enforcement actions may be founded, Mgbeoji's rigid
stance comes at the expense of pragmatism. What Mgbeoji fails to explore
is how the progressive interpretation of threats to collective security (which
he endorses) could influence established orthodoxy. If anything, the challenge posed by global terrorism and other emerging areas of security concerns provides the platform to reappraise the interpretation of threats to
collective security. This is indeed a defining moment in international law.
Mgbeoji's views undermine the concept of international law as an evolu-
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tionary process. To acknowledge a template shift in the approach to
collective security without regard to its potential impact on pre-existing
orthodoxy is not a balanced analysis.
Turning to the Security Council itself, Mgboeji joins the litany of scholars who have questioned the integrity and structure of the Council. He
describes the Council as an undemocratic body whose membership is based
on military might rather than global consensus and regional balance. Where
the Council does not abdicate its responsibility, its decisions to intervene
in troubled areas are influenced by racial affinity, geopolitical and
economic considerations, and the hemispheric concerns of the powerful
state members of the Council. This explains, in part, why there is glaring
disparity in the Council's response and intervention actions in Rwanda,
Kosovo, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kuwait, and Iraq. Similar hypocrisy and complicity "Influenced US indifference to the atrocities in East
Timor."' 9 These calculations, Mgbeoji argues, "may sometimes be
dangerously shortsighted. For example, until Afghanistan became a redoubt for Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, it was largely ignored by powerful
states, particularly the US."" Thus, it is Mgbeoji's view that in the Liberian
crisis, apart from its belated intervention, the willingness of the UN to
subordinate itself to the ECOMOG, despite the latter's less sophisticated
firepower, is an aspect of the racist undercurrent in the Council.
Putting aside the fact of subordination, which is not convincingly
argued, Mgbeoji's position here amounts to a reduction to absurdity. Even
though it may be presumed, not every act of intervention is successfully
resolved by the use of force or superiority of firepower in actual military
combat. Again, Mgbeoji fails to draw lessons from situations whereby
acti\ e participation of "external forces," in this case, non-African combat
personnel, is usually vulnerable to racial outrage and complicity. For
instance, the 1992 US experience in Somalia underlines the fact that
firepower is of little or no consequence without familiarity with the local
geographic terrain. Intervention must aim at results, not solely at the
assuagement of political feelings. There is no question that familiarity of
the Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops with the Liberian terrain was more effective than the sophisticated armory of non-African contingents from farflung places. Mgbeoji's position is inconsistent with his underlying support for an African-centred approach to the solution of African political
crises. The foregoing does not, however, undermine Mgbeoji's observation that the pattern of the Council's interventions lends weight to the sus-
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picion that a parochial, rather than a global peace agenda, is the motivation of the Council members.
In any case, as Mgbeoji points out, the ECOMOG-organized election in
Liberia as a containment measure was proportionate to the threat to peace
in the subregion posed by the Liberian crisis. Again, like his endorsement
of the legality of ECOWAS intervention while rejecting its ramification,
Mgbeoji rejects neo-liberal prescriptions of periodic elections and interventionist or ad hoc democracies as solutions to African political crisis.
Mgbeoji does not, however, go so far as to explicitly assert from Liberia's
example that adherence to such prescriptions has only resulted in bigots
and criminals desecrating the democratic institutions and sabotaging the
desire of peoples for self-determination. Nevertheless, on the basis of
Mgbeoji's analaysis, ,ve can situate the failure of Charles Taylor's democratic Liberia and the marching order given to him by the US to vacate the
presidential mansion as an indictment of the United States and other
neo-liberal protagonists. Without doubt, the prescription of mere periodic
elections as a panacea to the African political crisis by these neo-liberal
forces has led to the transformation of rebels, blood-thirsty cabals and deranged elites into occupiers of presidential mansions in Africa.
The escalation of the Liberian crisis to that country's immediate
neighbours and, eventually, to the entire West African region underscores
the truth that African nations have not been, and cannot be, completely
divorced from their precolonial national or ethnic affinities. As Mgbeoji
argues, postcolonial stability in Africa must radically reappraise the
notion of inviolability of colonial borders. African regional bodies must
prescribe an unmistakable "criteria for legitimate statehood and good
governance"" which must giN e due regard to precolonial African political
structures. A fundamental re-appraisal of African states as presently
constituted is necessary.
Unfortunately, Mgbeoji's analysis does not indicate how a new approach
to African statehood can be practically initiated save to indicate that his is
not a call to return to prehistoric times. He asserts that political and economic advantages maintained by unjust structures dating from colonial
times must be "lawfully and systematically, and equitably dismantled."22
"Equitably dismantled"?! How is that feat to be achieved? Further, is
Mgbeoji's call limited to Africa or is it global? It is difficult envisioning
how Mgbeoji's terse treatise on legitimacy and his call for restoration of
African precolonial political structures and value systems can spur a policy
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of transformation and change from Africa's present reality. The sad reality
of African colonial and postcolonial experience can be compared to a lone
traveler who has been lured to embark on a journey of unknown destination. She is too far into the journey to retrace her steps. The best she can do
is to make the most of what remains of her identity and to constructively
and positively confront the reality of her predicament. First, she must pause
and define her concept of identity, place, and home as the basis of her
constructive engagement with her present reality. This is the kind of pragmatism that escapes Mgbeoji's rhetoric. Looking too far into the past may
be counterproductive.
Collective Insecuriti, is an intelligent contribution to international law
and relations, political science, diplomacy, history, African studies and
sociology, and global politics. The wvriter's lucid style makes the book
accessible to all, including strangers to the disciplines directly implicated
by the subject of the book. Hugh Kindred's preface to the book reveals its
modest but not surprising evolution from a thesis for the Master of Laws
(LL.M.) degree. The thesis, which earned the Nigerian scholar the Canada
Governor General Gold Medal in 1999 for superior academic ability, indeed, evidences a distinguished intellect.
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